L'Iran lo ha abbattuto ma c'è altro in questa storia
The claim that Major General Qassem Soleimani was a “terrorist” on a
mission to carry out an “imminent” attack that would kill hundreds of
Americans turned out to be a lie, so why should one believe anything
else relating to recent developments in Iran and Iraq? To be sure,
Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 departing from Tehran’s Imam
Khomeini International Airport on the morning of January 8th
with 176 passengers and crew on board was shot down by Iranian air
defenses, something which the government of the Islamic Republic has
admitted, but there just might be considerably more to the story
involving cyberwarfare carried out by the U.S. and possibly Israeli
To be sure, the Iranian air defenses were on high alert fearing an American attack in the wake of the U.S. government’s assassination of Soleimani on January 3rd
followed by a missile strike from Iran directed against two U.S. bases
in Iraq. In spite of the tension and the escalation, the Iranian
government did not shut down the country’s airspace. Civilian passenger
flights were still departing and arriving in Tehran, almost certainly an
error in judgment on the part of the airport authorities. Inexplicably,
civilian aircraft continued to take off and land even after Flight 752
was shot down.
Fifty-seven of the passengers on the flight were Canadians of Iranian
descent, leading Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to point the finger both
at the Iranian government for its carelessness and also at Washington,
observing angrily that the Trump Administration had deliberately and recklessly sought
to “escalate tensions” with Iran through an attack near Baghdad
Airport, heedless of the impact on travelers and other civilians in the
What seems to have been a case of bad judgements and human error
does, however, include some elements that have yet to be explained. The
Iranian missile operator reportedly experienced considerable “jamming”
and the planes transponder switched off and stopped transmitting several minutes before the missiles were launched. There were also problems with the communication network of the air defense command, which may have been related.
The electronic jamming coming from an unknown source meant that the
air defense system was placed on manual operation, relying on human
intervention to launch. The human role meant that an operator had to
make a quick judgment in a pressure situation in which he had only
moments to react. The shutdown of the transponder, which would have
automatically signaled to the operator and Tor electronics that the
plane was civilian, instead automatically indicated that it was hostile.
The operator, having been particularly briefed on the possibility of
incoming American cruise missiles, then fired.
The two missiles that brought the plane down came from a Russian-made
system designated SA-15 by NATO and called Tor by the Russians. Its
eight missiles are normally mounted on a tracked vehicle. The system
includes both radar to detect and track targets as well as an
independent launch system, which includes an Identification Friend or
Foe (IFF) system functionality capable of reading call signs and
transponder signals to prevent accidents. Given what happened on that
morning in Tehran, it is plausible to assume that something or someone
deliberately interfered with both the Iranian air defenses and with the
transponder on the airplane, possibly as part of an attempt to create an
aviation accident that would be attributed to the Iranian government.
The SA-15 Tor defense system used by Iran has one major vulnerability. It can be hacked or "spoofed,"
permitting an intruder to impersonate a legitimate user and take
control. The United States Navy and Air Force reportedly have developed
technologies “that can fool enemy radar systems with false and
deceptively moving targets." Fooling the system also means fooling the
operator. The Guardian has also reported independently how
the United States military has long been developing systems that can
from a distance alter the electronics and targeting of Iran’s available
The same technology can, of course, be used to alter or even mask the
transponder on a civilian airliner in such a fashion as to send false
information about identity and location. The United States has the cyber
and electronic warfare capability to both jam and alter signals
relating to both airliner transponders and to the Iranian air defenses.
Israel presumably has the same ability. Joe Quinn at Sott.net also notes an interested back story to those photos and video footage that have appeared in the New York Times and
elsewhere showing the Iranian missile launch, the impact with the plane
and the remains after the crash, to include the missile remains. They
appeared on January 9th, in an Instagram account called 'Rich Kids of Tehran'.
Quinn asks how the Rich Kids happened to be in “a low-income housing
estate on the city's outskirts [near the airport] at 6 a.m. on the
morning of January 8th with cameras pointed at the right part of the sky in time to capture a missile hitting a Ukrainian passenger plane…?”
Put together the Rich Kids and the possibility of electronic warfare
and it all suggests a premeditated and carefully planned event of which the Soleimani assassination
was only a part. There have been riots in Iran subsequent to the
shooting down of the plane, blaming the government for its ineptitude.
Some of the people in the street are clearly calling for the goal long
sought by the United States and Israel, i.e. “regime change.” If nothing
else, Iran, which was widely seen as the victim in the killing of
Soleimani, is being depicted in much of the international media as
little more than another unprincipled actor with blood on its hands.
There is much still to explain about the downing of Ukrainian
International Airlines Flight 752.