have been killed and dozens more injured in what is an apparent
terrorist attack on St. Petersburg’s metro system. Western analysts are
assigning possible blame for the attack on either terrorists operating
from Russia’s Chechnya region, or possibly terrorist groups affiliated
with fronts fighting in Syria.
Western analysts are also attempting to
cement a narrative that downplays the significance of the attacks and
instead attempts to leverage them politically against Moscow.
(Traduzione in italiano: SE I TERRORISTI HANNO PRESO DI MIRA LA RUSSIA, CHI C'E' DIETRO I TERRORISTI?)
A piece in the Sydney Morning Herald titled, “Fears of a Putin crackdown after terror attack on St Petersburg metro,” would attempt to claim:
So who is to blame? No one has said
officially. The BBC’s Frank Gardner says suspicions will centre around
Chechen nationalists or an Islamic State inspired group wanting payback
for Putin’s airstrikes in Syria. Or it could be a combination of both.
Putin has in the past justified crackdowns on civilian protests
by citing the terror threat. But will he this time, and will it work?
At least one pro-Kremlin commentator
has linked the attack to the recent mass demonstrations organised by
Putin’s political opponent.
in reality, the demonstrations and the terrorist groups being
implicated both share a significant common denominator – both are openly
long-term recipients of US-European aid, with the latter group also
receiving significant material support from US-European allies in the
Persian Gulf, primarily Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab
support for foreign-funded organizations posing as “nongovernmental
organizations” (NGOs) running parallel efforts with terrorist
organizations undermining Moscow’s control over Chechnya have been ongoing for decades.
Beyond Chechnya, the United States’ own Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) would admit in a 2012 memo (PDF) that:
the situation unravels there is the possibility of establishing a
declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka
and Der Zor), and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the
opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime, which is
considered the strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran).
The DIA memo then explains exactly who this “Salafist principality’s” supporters are (and who its true enemies are):
The West, Gulf countries, and Turkey support the opposition; while Russia, China, and Iran support the regime.
essence, the “Salafist” (Islamic) “principality” (State) was a creation
of the US in pursuit of its attempted regime change agenda in Syria.
The current, self-proclaimed “Islamic State” is situated precisely in
eastern Syria where the DIA memo claimed its state sponsors sought to
place it. Its role in undermining Damascus and its allies’ attempts to
restore peace and order to the Syrian state is obvious.
fact that NATO-member Turkey served as a logistical, training, and
financial hub for not only the Islamic State’s activities, but also
other terrorist groups including Al Qaeda’s regional franchise – Al
Nusra – also further implicates not only possible Al Qaeda and Islamic
State involvement in the recent St. Petersburg blast, but also these
organizations’ state sponsors – those who “support the opposition” in
the United States played a direct role in the St. Petersburg blast or
not is inconsequential. Without the massive state sponsorship both
Washington and its European and Persian Gulf allies have provided these
groups, such global-spanning mayhem would be impossible. The fact that
the US seeks to undermine Russia politically, economically, and in many
ways, militarily, and has recently fielded US-European-funded mobs in
Russia’s streets – means that it is likely not a coincidence violence is
now also being employed against Russia within Russian territory.
As per US policymakers’ own documented machinations – such as the 2009 Brookings Institution report, “Which Path to Persia?: Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran” (PDF) – a
militant component is prescribed as absolutely essential for the
success of any street movement Washington manages to stir up against
In the Brookings Institution document,
it stated unequivocally in regards to toppling the government of Iran,
that (emphasis added):
if the United States ever succeeds in sparking a revolt against the
clerical regime, Washington may have to consider whether to provide it
with some form of military support to prevent Tehran from crushing it. This
requirement means that a popular revolution in Iran does not seem to
fit the model of the “velvet revolutions” that occurred elsewhere. The
point is that the Iranian regime may not be willing to go gently into
that good night; instead, and unlike so many Eastern European regimes,
it may choose to fight to the death. In those circumstances, if there is
not external military assistance to the revolutionaries, they might not
just fail but be massacred. Consequently, if the United States
is to pursue this policy, Washington must take this possibility into
consideration. It adds some very important requirements to the list:
either the policy must include ways to weaken the Iranian military or
weaken the willingness of the regime’s leaders to call on the military,
or else the United States must be ready to intervene to defeat it.”
policy document would also openly conspire to fund and arm listed
terrorist organizations including the notorious Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).
The document would state:
United States could work with groups like the Iraq-based National
Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and its military wing, the
Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), helping the thousands of its members who, under
Saddam Husayn’s regime, were armed and had conducted guerrilla and
terrorist operations against the clerical regime. Although the NCRI is
supposedly disarmed today, that could quickly be changed.
It would also admit that (emphasis added):
its defenders’ claims, the MEK remains on the U.S. government list of
foreign terrorist organizations. In the 1970s, the group killed three
U.S. officers and three civilian contractors in Iran. During the
1979-1980 hostage crisis, the group praised the decision to take America
hostages and Elaine Sciolino reported that while group leaders publicly
condemned the 9/11 attacks, within the group celebrations were
Undeniably, the group has conducted terrorist attacks—often
excused by the MEK’s advocates because they are directed against the
Iranian government. For example, in 1981, the group bombed the
headquarters of the Islamic Republic Party, which was then the clerical
leadership’s main political organization, killing an estimated 70 senior
officials. More recently, the group has claimed credit for over a dozen
mortar attacks, assassinations, and other assaults on Iranian civilian and military targets between 1998 and 2001. At the very least, to work more closely with the group (at least in an overt manner), Washington would need to remove it from the list of foreign terrorist organizations.
If US policymakers have openly conspired
to arm and fund known terrorist organizations guilty of murdering not
only civilians in nations like Iran but also citizens of the United
States itself, why would they hesitate to do likewise in Russia?
the US poses as engaged in a battle against the so-called “Islamic
State” in Syria, it has left its obvious, overt state sponsors unscathed
both politically and financially. If the bombing in St. Petersburg is
linked to US-European-Persian Gulf state sponsored terrorism, it will be
only the latest in a long and bloody tradition of using terrorism as a
US, having been frustrated in Syria and having little to no leverage at
the negotiation table, is likely trying to “show” Moscow that it can
still create chaos both beyond Russia’s borders amongst its allies, and
within Russia’s borders – regardless of how well Russians have weathered
such tactics in the past.
Tony Cartalucci, Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.